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Andy Clark has a mission. He has been
attaching the classical/computationalist
concept of representation for almost
25 years, always from different angle
and always with the purpose of sal-
vaging the concept of representation from
the mistaken classical/computationalist
assumptions. Unlike the new generation
of anti-representationalists and enactivists
who want to reject the concept of repre-
sentation altogether, he wants to keep it,
but he also wants to strip it from a wide
variety of computationalist garments [this
is the most explicit in Clark (1995, 1997),
Chapter 8]. The target article is his newest
attempt to do so.
Clark’s argument in this paper proceeds
in two steps:
(A) It uses empirical data to support
a theoretical model of the mind,
the “bidirectional hierarchical model
of brain functions” whereby “a cas-
cade of top-down processing gener-
ates low-level states from high-level
causes” (p. 25).
(B) It uses this theoretical model to draw
some philosophical conclusions.
I accept step A and focus on step
B. My aim is to argue that even if
we accept that the empirical data Clark
considers does support the “bidirectional
hierarchical model of brain functions,”
what he takes to be his most interest-
ing philosophical conclusion would still be
problematic.
More specifically, Clark makes three
strong philosophical claims about how we
should revise our philosophical theories
of the mind in general and the concept
of representation in particular in the
light of the empirical evidence that sup-
ports the “bidirectional hierarchical model
of brain functions”:
(a) The “bidirectional hierarchical model
of brain functions” shows that the dis-
tinction between perception and cog-
nition is blurred.
(b) A salient feature of the “bidirectional
hierarchical model of brain functions”
is that the “high-level” representation
is not about the present perceived
scene, but about what the perceived
scene will be when the “low-level”
input is processed. This means that
this “high-level” represents a future
state of affairs.
(c) The “bidirectional hierarchical mod-
els of brain functions” shows that
perceptual representations represent
probabilities (or, represent probabilis-
tically, or, represent probability den-
sity distributions—Clark does not
always distinguish these three inter-
pretations).
I agree with Clark that (a) and (b)
are very important philosophical conse-
quences that no philosophical account of
the mind should ignore (see, e.g., Nanay,
2011a, 2012, 2013, forthcoming). The
focus of this commentary is what Clark
takes to be the most groundbreaking of the
philosophical import of the “bidirectional
hierarchical model of brain functions,”
namely, the claim that perceptual repre-
sentations represent probabilities. This is
what makes his account Bayesian and this
is a philosophical or theoretical conclusion
that neuroscientists and psychologists are
also quick and happy to draw.
My claim is that nothing in the “bidi-
rectional hierarchical models of brain
functions” implies that perceptual repre-
sentations are probabilistic, or that they
represent or “encode probability density
distributions” [p. 21, see also Knill and
Pouget (2004), p. 713]. There is a much
more parsimonious way of describing
the representations in the bidirectional
hierarchical model of brain functions:
they attribute properties to objects (or
to the perceived scene) that are not
fully determinate (Yeshurun and Carrasco,
1998; Nanay, 2010, 2011b, 2013; Stazicker,
2011).
Properties can be more or less determi-
nate. To use a classic example, being red
is more determinate than being colored,
but less determinate than being scarlet
(Funkhouser, 2006). When a representa-
tion attributes a property to an object,
this property can then be more or less
determinate. Representing something as
red or representing it as scarlet (or a spe-
cific shade of scarlet) would amount to
different representations.
As long as we do not take perceptual
representations to attribute fully determi-
nate properties, we do not need to posit
probabilistic representations. Rather than
conjecturing that perceptual representa-
tions are probabilistic or that they encode
probability density distributions, we can
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describe them in a much less controver-
sial manner: they attribute less than fully
determinate properties. To use a very sim-
ple example, they do not represent the
probability density distribution of various
(fully determinate) shades of scarlet, ruby,
and crimson; they merely represent the
less than fully determinate (or, as some
philosophers say, determinable) property
of red.
We have plenty of independent empiri-
cal evidence for this way of thinking about
perceptual representations: we know that
our perceptual system cannot attribute
highly determinate color properties to the
periphery of our visual field and the inat-
tentional and change blindness experi-
ments suggest that our perceptual system
does not even attribute fully determinate
properties to more central parts of the
perceived scene.
But if this is so, then we can use
a similar move when it comes to the
bidirectional hierarchical model of brain
functions: the “top level” in this model
could also be interpreted as represent-
ing the perceived scene as having not
fully determinate properties that the “bot-
tom level” then makes more determi-
nate. Nothing in this way of cashing out
the bidirectional hierarchical model of
brain functions implies either that these
representations are probabilistic or that
they represent “probability density dis-
tributions.” The changes in the deter-
minacy of the properties attributed by
these representation may follow Bayesian
rules, but the representations themselves
neither represent probabilities nor repre-
sent whatever they represent probabilisti-
cally.
Clark’s oeuvre can be split into two
very different streams when it comes to
criticisms of the classical/computationalist
concept of representation. On the one
hand, he urges philosophers and cog-
nitive scientists to work with a con-
cept of representation that is simpler,
less over-intellectualized, and more sim-
ilar to the representational capacities of
simple animals (Clark, 1989, 1995, 1997,
2009). One the other hand, he empha-
sizes uniquely human, highly complex and
not at all animal-like aspects of our rep-
resentational system (Clark and Chalmers,
1998; Clark, 2008). The present article
clearly belongs to the former group: it
emphasizes an aspect of the mind that is
present both in animals and in humans.
But then shouldn’t we opt for the least
over-intellectualizing, most parsimonious
concept of the representations in the
bidirectional hierarchical model of brain
functions? If we do, these representa-
tions will have nothing Bayesian about
them.
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